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Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem 
Brannon P. Denning* 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the various branches of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine (DCCD)—the judge-made rules grounded in the 
Constitution’s grant of power over interstate commerce to 
Congress—is that which prohibits “extraterritorial” state legislation. 
As recently as 1989, the Supreme Court held that the DCCD 
“‘precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes 
place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the State.’”1  
That broad articulation of the principle, however, represented 
extraterritoriality’s high tide. The Court has since retreated; in 2003, 
it seemed to limit the extraterritoriality principle dramatically, 
rejecting arguments that a Maine prescription-drug subsidy program 
actually attempted to fix prices outside the state.2 At this point, the 
extraterritoriality principle looks to be quite moribund. 
As Donald Regan noted during extraterritoriality’s heyday, 
“[W]e do not understand the extraterritoriality principle . . . nearly as 
well as we should.”3 While Regan believed it was a constitutional 
principle, he rejected the notion that extraterritoriality had anything 
to do with the DCCD.4 The Court apparently agreed. 
This Article, then, is an autopsy of sorts. Assuming, as I do, that 
extraterritoriality—at least the strong form articulated by the Court 
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 1. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
For articles on extraterritoriality generally, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. 
Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 
(2001); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State 
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987); Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond 
the Reach of States: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State 
Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467 (2003). 
 2. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass’n v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
 3. Regan, supra note 1, at 1884.  
 4. Id. at 1888 (arguing that early cases demonstrate that “the 
extraterritoriality principle does not flow from the dormant commerce clause”). 
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in the 1980s—is dead, and unlikely to be revived by the current 
Court, its passing offers an opportunity to examine the lifecycle of 
constitutional doctrine, from birth to death.5 Kermit Roosevelt has 
argued that doctrine and doctrinal rules can suffer from 
“calcification” that causes courts to alter those rules or discard them 
altogether.6 Close study may reveal information about what, exactly, 
the Court sought through the doctrine’s development and 
enforcement and why the Court ultimately abandoned it. 
In Part I, I describe extraterritoriality’s early emergence. In its 
early form, extraterritoriality was not exclusively yoked to the 
DCCD. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
also cited as a source of the extraterritoriality doctrine, as were less 
clause-bound structural principles. Beginning in the early twentieth 
century, however, the doctrine became closely linked with the 
DCCD; it emerged as a robust branch of the DCCD in the 1980s. 
This association is described in Part II. Extraterritoriality’s decline is 
detailed in Part III. In Part IV, I return to the question of what 
“killed” extraterritoriality. I conclude that extraterritoriality’s demise 
was likely overdetermined. Factors contributing to the doctrine’s 
demise include what Kermit Roosevelt calls a “loss of fit” between 
the doctrine and the purposes of the DCCD generally, as well as the 
doctrine’s calcification; the lack of a limiting principle that would 
prevent it from curtailing legitimate state regulatory power; the 
Court’s decision to locate limits on punitive damage awards in the 
Due Process Clause after flirting with the notion that those limits 
grew out of DCCD extraterritoriality; and the Court’s apparent shift 
away from robust enforcement of the DCCD generally to limitation 
of the doctrine. In Part V, I consider the impact of 
extraterritoriality’s demise on a related doctrine: the Court’s 
periodic invalidation of state laws that presented the problem of 
“inconsistent state regulations.” A brief conclusion follows. 
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
The concern with “territoriality”—ensuring that a state did not 
exceed its legitimate legislative jurisdiction—was long a concern of 
                                                                                                             
 5. I accept as descriptively accurate Mitchell Berman’s “two-outputs thesis” 
that the Supreme Court, when it interprets the Constitution, first establishes 
“constitutional operative propositions”—what the Constitution requires or 
prohibits—by interpreting the document, then operationalizes those propositions 
by crafting “decision rules” that it then applies to facts to produce judgments. See 
generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2004). I will employ Professor Berman’s terminology throughout this Article. 
 6. Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes 
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1693 (2005). 
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public international law.7 By the early twentieth century, it assumed 
domestic importance in conflicts-of-laws disputes as well.8 Courts 
assumed that “regulation of extraterritorial conduct was . . . 
illegitimate”9 and devised various tests to resolve conflicts between 
legal regimes of different states.10 Initially, however, the 
constitutional bases for the extraterritoriality principle were the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of Article IV, not the DCCD.11 Extraterritoriality as a 
DCCD problem can be traced to the Court’s 1852 decision in 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.12 
In Cooley, Justice Curtis attempted to resolve the stalemate that 
had developed on the Court among those who thought the 
Commerce Clause had some independent preemptive effects on 
state legislation and those who believed that state regulations of 
interstate commerce were preempted only when they conflicted with 
an affirmative act of Congress.13 Curtis’s gambit was to ignore the 
question of whether the Commerce Clause conferred exclusive 
power in favor of focusing on the subject of regulation. In his 
formulation, those subjects that were national in nature and required 
a single, uniform rule were beyond the regulatory power of states. 
On the other hand, states were competent to regulate “local” subjects 
that could tolerate myriad regulatory schemes.14 
                                                                                                             
 7. Austin Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1463–64 (2008) (terming territoriality a “defining feature” 
of public international law). See also Willis Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (1979). 
 8. See generally WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94–95 (3d ed. 2002). 
 9. Parrish, supra note 7, at 1465; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 
(1881) (“No State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.”). 
 10. Originating with Joseph Story and continuing to influence the work of 
Joseph Beal and the First Restatement, Conflict of Laws, was the “vested rights” 
theory “based on the idea that at the moment a cause of action arises, rights vest 
according to the law of the place where the crucial event occurred.” RICHMAN & 
REYNOLDS, supra note 8, § 56. This strict territorial approach has been displaced 
by the Second Restatement’s “general principle that the law of the state with the 
‘most significant relationship’ to a transaction should control.” Id. Another 
influential approach, pioneered by Brainerd Currie, “argued that the choice-of-law 
process should focus on the policies behind state substantive law rules; whether a 
rule should be applied should depend upon whether the policy underlying that rule 
would be advanced by its application.” Id. 
 11. Id. at § 94 (“Historically, the most important provisions in [choice-of-law 
disputes] have been the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article Four.”). 
 12. 53 U.S. 299 (1852). 
 13. See generally 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 357–95 (1974). 
 14. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319. 
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But Curtis provided no criteria by which one could determine 
whether the subject of legislation was national or local, so the Court 
devised another set of decision rules. State laws regulating interstate 
commerce directly were invalidated, while those regulating 
commerce only indirectly were permitted.15 The terms direct and 
indirect roughly corresponded to Cooley’s national and local 
subjects, respectively. Extraterritorial regulations and taxes were 
regarded as impermissible direct regulations of interstate commerce 
and struck down.  
In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Brown,16 for example, 
the Court invalidated a South Carolina state court award arising out 
of a statutory cause of action for mental anguish imposed on a 
telegraph company for failure to deliver a telegram in Washington, 
D.C. While the Court seemed to hold that the judgment was a 
violation of the defendant’s due process rights, it added that  
the act also is objectionable in its . . . attempt to regulate 
commerce among the states. That is . . . it attempts to 
determine the conduct required of the telegraph company in 
transmitting a message from one state to another or to this 
District by determining the consequences of not pursuing 
such conduct . . . .17  
For support, the Court cited Western Union Telegraph Company v. 
Pendleton,18 in which the Court invalidated the application of an 
Indiana law requiring telegrams to be delivered in the order received 
to a telegram transmitted from Indiana to Iowa. “[T]he attempted 
regulation by Indiana of the mode in which messages sent by 
telegraphic companies doing business within her limits shall be 
delivered in other states,” the Court wrote, “is an impediment to the 
freedom of that form of interstate commerce, which is . . . beyond 
the power of Indiana to interpose . . . .”19 
Bernard Gavit, author of an early treatise on the Commerce 
Clause, complained that such cases ought to be decided under the 
Due Process Clause. “A rule of law which purports to affect conduct 
outside of the state is void, and in truth no rule. . . . It is beyond the 
                                                                                                             
 15. The Court’s cases during this period are surveyed by Barry Cushman’s 
excellent article, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000). See also Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 437–40 
(2008) (discussing the direct–indirect test). 
 16. 234 U.S. 542 (1914). 
 17. Id. at 547. 
 18. 122 U.S. 347 (1887). 
 19. Id. at 358. 
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power of a state to so impose its authority beyond its own limits.”20 
In those cases, “the decision should be made . . . under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and not under the Commerce Clause,” he 
argued.21 He went on to write, “It can well be argued . . . that it is no 
rule, and therefore no regulation. The Commerce Clause ought 
never to be reached.”22 
Indeed, until the Court decided Quill Corporation v. North 
Dakota,23 the Court relied on both the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses to limit states’ ability to exercise taxing jurisdiction over 
nonresidents. In many cases, the decisions did not clearly distinguish 
between the two clauses.24 The theory was that under the Due 
Process Clause the state lacked sufficient minimum contacts with 
certain taxpayers to compel them to pay taxes. As for the Commerce 
Clause, the early understanding was that interstate commerce qua 
interstate commerce was immune from state taxation because to tax 
interstate commerce was to directly regulate it.25 
Concerns lingered about the ability of states to regulate interstate 
commerce beyond their borders, namely, exposing commerce to 
conflicting regulatory regimes, perhaps enabling a state to set a de 
facto national standard by legislating more strictly than its neighbors 
and incentivizing interstate commercial actors to comply with the 
strictest standard. The Pendleton Court, for example, observed that 
the purpose of the Commerce Clause was “to secure, with reference 
to its subjects, uniform regulations, where such uniformity is 
practicable, against conflicting state legislation.”26 It noted that 
“[s]uch conflicting legislation would inevitably follow with 
reference to telegraphic communications between citizens of 
                                                                                                             
 20. BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 185 (AMS Press 1970) (1930). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 24. See, e.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 
(1967) (holding that both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause 
prevent the state from exercising taxing jurisdiction over a mail-order house with 
no physical presence in the state); GAVIT, supra note 20, at 372 (“There seems to 
be no difference in result whether a property tax is tested by the Fourteenth 
Amendment or by the Commerce Clause.”). 
 25. 1 JEROME HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE 
TAXATION ¶ 4.03[1] (3d ed. 1998 & 2012 Supp.) (noting that the Court formerly 
embraced the view that “direct taxes on interstate commerce violated the 
Commerce Clause” and that the prohibition on “direct taxes” included a ban on 
taxing goods in transit in interstate commerce). 
 26. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347, 358 (1887). 
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different states, if each state was vested with power to control them 
beyond its own limits.”27 
Despite its gradual replacement by both the antidiscrimination 
principle and by the balancing of benefits and burdens for 
nondiscriminatory, nontax regulations,28 the direct–indirect test 
proved surprisingly durable, lasting into the 1930s. It was clear by 
then that the Court regarded extraterritorial regulation as a 
quintessential “direct” burden on interstate commerce. In Baldwin v. 
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,29 Justice Cardozo, for a unanimous Court, struck 
down a New York statute that banned the in-state sale of out-of-state 
milk unless the price paid for the imported milk was equal to New 
York’s minimum price. “New York,” Cardozo wrote, “has no power 
to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be 
paid in that state for milk acquired there.”30 Cardozo concluded that 
the prohibition was the functional equivalent of regulating prices in 
other states.31 And that, he added, was precisely the sort of “‘direct[] 
burden . . . of interstate business’” that the Commerce Clause 
prohibited states from imposing.32 
A half-century later, for about a decade, the Supreme Court built 
on Justice Cardozo’s statement in Baldwin, articulating a rather 
sweeping extraterritoriality principle with far-reaching implications. 
Those cases demonstrate the Court’s continued concern with 
conflicting regulatory regimes and impermissible extraterritorial 
projections of state power. 
II. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE EXTRATERRITORIALITY COMES OF 
AGE33 
In the previous Part, I argued that in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the Court sought to cabin states’ legislative, 
taxing, and judicial jurisdiction. While many of these limits were 
located in the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause played a 
role, too. In many cases, moreover, courts took no particular care to 
carefully distinguish which clause was doing what work. Describing 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. 
 28. This evolution is described in Denning, supra note 15, at 443–48.  
 29. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
 30. Id. at 521. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 522. 
 33. Parts II and III draw from BRANNON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE 
REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.08[E] (2d ed. 2013). 
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nineteenth century judges, Michael Greve once quipped that while 
the judges were formalists, they were not clause-bound formalists.34  
By the 1980s, the Due Process Clause ceased to operate as much 
of a restraint on states’ exercises of either personal jurisdiction35 or 
legislative jurisdiction in choice-of-law cases.36 In 1992, the Court 
would hold that “minimum contacts” sufficed to create a proper 
nexus between a taxpayer and a taxing state.37 During that same 
time, moreover, the Court abandoned its previous holding that direct 
taxation of interstate commerce was a violation of the Commerce 
Clause.38 In 1977, the Court decided the seminal Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,39 in which it announced a four-part test for 
state and local taxes.40 Two of Complete Auto’s factors—substantial 
nexus and apportionment—directly addressed concerns about 
extraterritorial exercises of taxing jurisdiction and the dangers of 
multiple taxation. 
                                                                                                             
 34. Personal communication with the author. See also DAN T. COENEN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 272 n.55 (2004) (“The 
relationship between due-process and dormant Commerce Clause requirements 
with regard to state regulatory programs is not well-developed.”). 
 35. See, e,g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(holding that due process is satisfied for exercising jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the jurisdiction] 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice’” (citations omitted)). 
 36. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (holding 
that to apply its law a “[s]tate must have a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 
486 U.S. 717 (1988) (applying Hague); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797 (1985) (applying Hague). The trilogy is discussed in RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, 
supra note 8, § 97, at 301–10. The authors conclude that “Allstate shows that not 
much is needed to satisfy the Court, at least as long as there is some ‘real’ 
connection with the litigation.” Id. at 309. 
 37. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 (1992) (overruling in part 
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)). The 
Court declined, however, to overrule that portion of National Bellas Hess holding 
that the Commerce Clause required a physical presence to satisfy the Clause’s 
“substantial nexus” requirement, at least for the collection and remittance of sales 
taxes. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314; COENEN, supra note 34, at 272 n.55 (“In at least 
some state tax cases . . . the so-called nexus limitation developed under the 
dormant Commerce Clause has been given a longer reach than the 
extraterritoriality restriction imposed by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 38. See Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). 
 39. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 40. Under the now-canonical test, state and local taxes on interstate 
commerce are valid if (1) there is a substantial nexus between the taxpayer and the 
taxing state; (2) the tax is apportioned; (3) the tax is nondiscriminatory; and (4) the 
tax is fairly related to benefits provided the taxpayer. Id. at 277–78.  
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Were it not for a series of cases in the 1980s, then, what I will 
hereafter term DCCD extraterritoriality would likely have “come to 
[an] arid end[]”41 as had many other decision rules in this area. This 
line of cases revived the concept, at least temporarily, until the Court 
essentially abandoned it in 2003. 
A. Edgar v. MITE Corporation 
In 1982, the Court invalidated an Illinois antitakeover statute in 
Edgar v. MITE Corporation42 that required registration of takeover 
offers of corporations in which Illinois citizens owned more than 
10% of the shares; or in which two of the following conditions 
obtained: (1) the target corporation’s principal place of business was 
located in Illinois; (2) it was organized under the laws of Illinois; or 
(3) 10% of its capital was located in the state.43 Following 
registration, the Illinois Secretary of State had 20 days during which 
he could hold a hearing to evaluate the offer’s fairness. A hearing 
was mandatory if requested by a majority of the firm’s outside 
directors or by Illinois citizens owning 10% of the class of securities 
subject to the takeover.44 While the Court declined to find the 
Illinois law preempted by federal law,45 it gave alternative reasons 
why the act violated the DCCD. 
In a plurality opinion, Justice Byron White argued that by 
regulating transactions occurring outside of its borders, the Illinois 
Act had impermissible extraterritorial effects. “The Illinois Act,” 
White noted, “directly regulates transactions which take place across 
state lines, even if wholly outside the State of Illinois.”46 He 
continued, “It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct 
restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping 
extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose such 
regulations, so may other States; and interstate commerce in 
securities transactions generated by tender offers would be 
thoroughly stifled.”47 
By contrast, an Indiana antitakeover statute regulating only 
entities incorporated in Indiana was upheld five years later in CTS 
Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America.48 The Indiana 
                                                                                                             
 41. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS 100–01 (1957). 
 42. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).  
 43. Id. at 627. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 631–40. 
 46. Id. at 641.  
 47. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion).  
 48. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).  
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statute conditioned “acquisition of control of a corporation on approval 
of a majority of the pre-existing disinterested shareholders.”49 
Reaffirming the connection between extraterritoriality and inconsistent 
state regulation, the Court cited prior cases for the proposition that the 
Court had applied the DCCD to invalidate “statutes that may 
adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to 
inconsistent regulations” but added that was not the case here.50 “So 
long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it 
has created,” the Court wrote, “each corporation will be subject to the 
law of only one State.”51 Justice White, dissenting, echoed his 
plurality opinion in MITE Corporation, complaining that the Indiana 
Act “directly regulat[ed] the purchase and sale of shares of stock in 
interstate commerce” and was therefore unconstitutional.52 
B. The Price Affirmation Cases 
Around the same time, the Court invalidated two “price 
affirmation” statutes that required wholesalers of alcoholic 
beverages to file price schedules with state regulators and sell their 
products in other states no cheaper than the prices declared on the 
schedules.53 The Court found both laws to have impermissible 
extraterritorial effects. 
In the first case, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York 
State Liquor Authority, the distiller had run afoul of New York’s 
price affirmation statute by offering cash “promotional allowances” 
to its wholesalers nationwide.54 New York wholesalers, however, 
could not legally accept those allowances under state law, so 
regulators charged that the “effective price” of New York liquor was 
higher than that in other states where the payments were permitted.55 
Justice Marshall wrote that while a state can “seek lower prices for 
its consumers, it may not insist that producers or consumers in other 
States surrender whatever competitive advantages they may 
possess.”56 The Court focused its inquiry “on whether New York’s 
                                                                                                             
 49. Id. at 73–74 (footnote omitted). 
 50. Id. at 88. 
 51. Id. at 89; see also id. at 93 (“We agree that Indiana has no interest in 
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations. But this Act 
applies only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.”). 
 52. Id. at 99 (White, J., dissenting).  
 53. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (divided court) (invalidating 
Connecticut price affirmation statute for beer); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (divided court) (invalidating New 
York price affirmation statute for liquor).  
 54. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 578. 
 55. Id. at 576–77. 
 56. Id. at 580. 
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affirmation law regulates commerce in other States.”57 It concluded 
that it did, adding that “[f]orcing a merchant to seek regulatory 
approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in another 
directly regulates interstate commerce”58 and was prohibited by the 
DCCD. 
Extraterritoriality hit its high water mark three years later in 
Healy v. The Beer Institute, in which the Court struck down a 
Connecticut price affirmation statute that applied to beer sales in 
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island.59 The Court declared 
that Brown-Forman reaffirmed and elaborated “our established view 
that a state law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce 
occurring wholly outside that State’s borders is invalid under the 
Commerce Clause.”60 Justice Blackmun synthesized the Court’s 
extraterritoriality cases, concluding that 
[t]aken together, our cases concerning the extraterritorial 
effects of state economic regulation stand at a minimum for 
the following propositions: First, the “Commerce Clause . . . 
precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that 
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or 
not the commerce has effects within the State,” and, 
specifically, a State may not adopt legislation that has the 
practical effect of establishing “a scale of prices for use in 
other states.” Second, a statute that directly controls 
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a 
State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s 
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s 
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. The 
critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the 
State. Third, the practical effect of the statute must be 
evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the 
statute itself, but also by considering how the challenged 
statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of 
other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many 
or every, State adopted similar legislation. Generally 
speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. That conclusion followed the Court’s discussion of the Baldwin case. 
Id. 
 58. Id. at 582. In addition, the Court continued to link extraterritoriality and 
exposure to inconsistent regulations. Id. at 583 (noting that the “proliferation of 
state affirmation laws . . . has greatly multiplied the likelihood that a seller will be 
subjected to inconsistent obligations in different States”).  
 59. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 60. Id. at 332. 
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legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory 
regime into the jurisdiction of another State. And, 
specifically, the Commerce Clause dictates that no State may 
force an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory approval in 
one State before undertaking a transaction in another.61 
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Connecticut statute was 
“indistinguishable” from the New York statute invalidated in 
Brown-Forman and struck it down.62 Extraterritoriality seemed to 
stall after Healy, though in 1996 the Court again invoked the 
principle as part of BMW v. Gore’s63 limit on the ability of states to 
impose punitive damages for conduct occurring outside the state. 
C. BMW v. Gore: Extraterritoriality’s Indian Summer 
When a Birmingham, Alabama, doctor discovered that his new 
BMW had been damaged, repaired, and repainted prior to sale as 
“new,” he sued, claiming that nondisclosure of the presale damage 
constituted fraud.64 A state court jury agreed, awarding the plaintiff 
$4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive 
damages. The measure of the punitive damages was the total 
number of cars repaired, repainted, and sold as new around the 
country multiplied by $4,000—the reduction in the car’s value 
caused by the repainting.65 The Alabama Supreme Court later 
reduced the punitive damage award to $2 million.66 
Before concluding that even the reduced award violated the Due 
Process Clause,67 however, the United States Supreme Court noted 
that the jury computed the award based on conduct occurring in 
other states, including states in which the conduct would not have 
been illegal.68 The laws concerning deceptive trade practices were, 
the Court observed, “a patchwork of rules representing the diverse 
policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 States.”69 Reasonable 
legislators could—and did—disagree about the level of disclosure 
required in situations like the one at issue. But, absent a national 
standard issued from Congress, each state was entitled to define 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 335–37 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 62. Id. at 339. Alternatively, Justice Blackmun found that the law was 
discriminatory because only wholesalers that engaged in interstate commerce 
needed to file the price schedule with the state. Id. at 340. 
 63. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 564. 
 66. Id. at 567. 
 67. Id. at 574–86. 
 68. Id. at 568–74. 
 69. Id. at 570. 
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fraud for itself. “[N]o single State could . . . impose its own policy 
choice on neighboring States.”70 Citing Healy and MITE, the Court 
concluded that “principles of state sovereignty and comity [dictate] 
that a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its 
laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in 
other States.”71 
Was BMW v. Gore an extraterritoriality case with DCCD 
implications? Professor Tribe thought so. In the third edition of his 
treatise, he cited the case as “underscor[ing]” the “sweep of the 
principle” announced in Healy.72 Gore did not mark a rebirth of 
DCCD extraterritoriality, however. In 2003, the Court retreated 
from Healy’s broad pronouncements and largely restricted earlier 
cases to their facts. In that same term, moreover, the Court 
abandoned Gore’s suggestion that the DCCD was the source of 
constitutional limits on punitive damages and instead identified the 
Due Process Clause as the sole source of those limits.73 
III. THE DEATH OF A DOCTRINE 
The retrenchment occurred in Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh.74 Maine passed a series of laws 
intended to bring down the price of prescription drugs. Part of the 
plan required drug manufacturers (none of which were located in 
Maine) to enter into rebate agreements with the state. Under these 
agreements, the manufacturers would rebate money to the state for 
drugs dispensed through its Medicaid program in exchange for 
avoiding a costly “preauthorization” process before drugs would be 
prescribed to state Medicaid patients. That money would then 
subsidize the sale of discount drugs to Maine citizens through a new 
state program (the “Maine Rx Plan”).75  
The petitioners claimed that the “voluntary” rebate agreements 
had an impermissible extraterritorial effect. First, citing the holdings 
of Healy, et al., that states may not regulate transactions occurring in 
other states, the petitioners argued that “Maine mandates payments 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. at 571. 
 71. Id. at 572 (footnote omitted). 
 72. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1078 n.21 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 73. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
See also infra notes 134–39 and accompanying text. 
 74. 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
 75. Id. at 653–54. For a more detailed description of the Maine Rx program, 
see Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[age], 29 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 7, 9–10 (2003). 
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from manufacturers whose only transactions leading to the 
pharmacy counter are with wholesalers. To the extent that those 
sales occur outside Maine—and virtually all manufacturers’ sales 
do—Maine cannot mandate the Maine Rx payments consistent with 
the Commerce Clause.”76 Second, the petitioners analogized the 
rebate to a sales tax and argued that it could not survive application 
of the Court’s Complete Auto test. 
At a minimum, the Maine Rx program would fail the first of 
the Complete Auto elements. The Maine Rx rebate “taxes” 
drug manufacturers when third parties sell the 
manufacturers’ products in Maine. While Maine clearly has 
the authority to tax in-state retail pharmaceutical sales, and 
may tax either the individual purchasers or the Maine-based 
pharmacies that sell drugs manufactured by PhRMA’s 
members, it may not require out-of-state manufacturers who 
are strangers to the instate retail transactions to bear the costs 
of this activity. Thus, if Maine purports to tax the only 
“activity with a substantial nexus to the taxing state” (i.e., 
the retail sales), it may not impose this liability on out-of-
state entities that are not involved in or responsible for that 
in-state activity.  
 
Alternatively, if Maine purports to be taxing the “activity” of 
manufacturers—namely, wholesale sales—the Maine Rx 
rebate requirement even more obviously fails Complete 
Auto’s nexus requirement. Maine may not require out-of-
state manufacturers to pay sales taxes on out-of-state 
wholesale transactions that have no relationship to the state 
of Maine.77 
The Court—in the portion of its opinion addressing the DCCD 
challenge—unanimously disagreed: 
[U]nlike price control or price affirmation statutes, “the Maine 
Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, 
either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect. Maine 
does not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a 
wholesaler for a certain price. Similarly, Maine is not tying 
the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices.”78 
                                                                                                             
 76. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 
538 U.S. 644 (2003) (No. 01-188), 2002 WL 31120844. 
 77. Id. at 32. 
 78. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669. 
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The Court did not mention Healy’s statement that the “critical 
inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”79 No mention whatever 
was made of MITE and its concern about the “direct” regulation of 
out-of-state conduct. 
In the years since Walsh, lower courts have generally restricted 
extraterritoriality along the lines suggested by the Court’s narrow 
reading of its previous cases. Generally speaking, lower courts tend to 
invalidate statutes (1) when there are Brown-Forman- or Healy-like 
price controls linking prices in the regulating jurisdiction to those 
charged elsewhere;80 (2) where it is clear that a statute seeks to enable 
State A to control activities occurring in State B, or to use Baldwin’s 
phrase, where State A is “projecting” its legislation into State B;81 
                                                                                                             
 79. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 80. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. 
Supp. 2d 56, 67–71 (D.D.C. 2005) (striking down a D.C. statute making it 
unlawful for drug manufacturers “to sell or supply for sale or impose minimum 
resale requirements for a patented prescription drug that results in the prescription 
drug being sold in the District for an excessive price” and which provides that a 
prima facie case for excessiveness could be made out where the wholesale price of 
a drug sold in D.C. was 30% higher than comparable price of drug sold in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, or Australia and holding that the ordinance 
had an impermissible extraterritorial effect). But see Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. 
Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting arguments that Maine statute 
barring automobile manufacturers from recouping costs associated with other law 
requiring retail-rate reimbursements to dealers for repairs made under warranty 
from in-state automobile dealers had impermissible extraterritorial effects in 
noting that “the Alliance has not provided any other, more reliable proof of the 
price-tying allegedly associated with the recoupment bar”). 
 81. See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668–69 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (opinion by Judge Posner invalidating state application of consumer 
credit code to out-of-state car title lender making loans to state’s citizens); 
Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 
1142 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that state right of publicity statute that regulated 
“a variety of transactions occurring ‘wholly outside’ Washington’s borders” 
violated the extraterritoriality principle); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. 
Litig., 755 F. Supp. 2d 857, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that application of 
state blue sky laws to transaction occurring wholly outside the state violated the 
extraterritoriality prong of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine); cf. Knoll 
Pharm. Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615, 622–24 (E.D. Ill. 1999) (striking 
down Illinois law prohibiting the advertisement, within the state, of an FDA-
approved weight-loss drug and holding that compliance with the advertising ban 
was not possible without the cessation of the national advertising campaign). But 
see S. Union Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 289 F.3d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting the claim that the law requiring administrative approval for stock 
purchases of other utility companies, regardless of whether they operated in the 
state, violated the extraterritoriality principle). 
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and (3) in certain cases dealing with early state regulation of the 
Internet.82 
By contrast, lower courts have rejected extraterritoriality 
arguments brought by manufacturers whose products must be 
labeled in a particular way before being sold in a state, even if 
compliance with the state law would require changes in their out-of-
state manufacturing processes.83 Similarly, it is not impermissible 
extraterritorial legislation to require out-of-state sellers to comply 
with state law when vending their products in the regulating state.84 
And in a variety of other circumstances the courts have made clear 
that extraterritoriality is not an all-purpose deregulatory tool 
allowing interstate companies to escape the reach of state legislators 
and regulators where they do business, even though compliance 
causes effects that are felt beyond the regulating jurisdiction.85 
                                                                                                             
 82. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102–04 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(striking down Vermont’s statute governing sexually explicit content on the 
Internet and concluding that the statute constituted impermissible extraterritorial 
regulation); Se. Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786, 787 
(D.S.C. 2005) (invalidating the South Carolina statute prohibiting dissemination of 
material “harmful to minors” over the Internet because the act “regulat[es] 
commerce occurring wholly outside of South Carolina” (citation omitted)); Ctr. 
for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 662 (E.D. Pa. 2004) 
(striking down the state law requiring Internet service providers to remove or 
disable access to child pornography either stored on or available through its 
service and noting that the Act “has the practical effect of exporting 
Pennsylvania’s domestic policies” (citation omitted)). But see Simmons v. State, 
944 So. 2d 317, 329–35 (Fla. 2006) (upholding a conviction under state statutes 
prohibiting electronic mail transmission of material that is harmful to one known 
to be a minor living in the state and luring or enticing a child through electronic 
means against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge in holding that the 
transmission statute did not regulate extraterritorially); Goldsmith & Sykes, supra 
note 1 (criticizing the use of extraterritoriality to invalidate state Internet 
regulations).  
 83. See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647 (6th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting an extraterritoriality challenge to a state regulation curbing 
allegedly misleading labeling of dairy products with regard to nonuse of 
antibiotics or growth hormones); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 
110 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff’s “extraterritoriality contention fails 
because the statute does not inescapably require manufacturers to label all lamps 
wherever distributed”). 
 84. See, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 192–95 (2d Cir. 
2007) (rejecting the argument that the Connecticut law regulating prepaid, stored 
value gift cards regulated extraterritorially) (“SPGGC fails to allege any facts 
tending to show . . . how the effects of the Gift Card Law might be projected into 
other states. . . . [T]he Gift Card Law does not, by its terms or its effects, directly 
regulate sales of gift cards in other states.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 
2008) (rejecting the argument that the application of the state consumer credit 
code to an Internet payday lender violated the extraterritoriality principle); Wine & 
994 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
 
 
Courts will also supply a saving construction to prevent a state 
statute from having impermissible extraterritorial effects.86 
                                                                                                             
 
Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting 
a DCCD attack on state liquor laws prohibiting liquor franchises and franchise-
type business activities by liquor licensees in holding that the statutes did not 
regulate extraterritorially); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 
310–312 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the Maine act requiring pharmacy benefit 
managers to act as fiduciaries for their clients and imposing specific duties on 
them, including disclosure of conflicts and of financial arrangements with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, did not have impermissible extraterritorial effects 
in holding that the act did not attempt to control out-of-state activities); Freedom 
Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejecting cigarette 
importers’ arguments that the New York contraband statute operated with 
impermissible extraterritorial effects); Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l 
Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219, 1223–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the state statute 
protecting equipment dealers did not operate with impermissible extraterritorial 
reach with respect to the contract between the parties that supported the California 
choice of law and noting that the statute “only applies to this case because the 
parties chose to be governed by California law”); Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 
153 P.3d 846, 854–56 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to the state minimum wage act as applied to an interstate trucker 
who worked part of his hours outside the state); Kearney v. Salomon Smith 
Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 921–922 (Cal. 2006) (concluding that the application 
of California privacy law in a conflict-of-law case involving conduct occurring in 
Georgia and California would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause) 
(“[A]pplication of the California law here at issue would affect only a business’s 
undisclosed recording of telephone conversations with clients or consumers in 
California and would not compel any action or conduct of the business with regard 
to conversations with non-California clients or consumers.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 356 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding state legislation implementing a nationwide tobacco settlement 
requiring tobacco companies not party to the settlement to escrow certain monies 
based on number of in-state sales and rejecting the extraterritoriality claim because 
“Virginia’s qualifying statute . . . rather than aiming at or reacting to commerce 
outside of Virginia, specifically limits its applicability to the sale of cigarettes 
‘within the Commonwealth’” (citations omitted)); Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith 
Elecs. Corp., 142 F.3d 373, 378–381 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying such a saving 
construction to the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law); Hampton Feedlot, Inc. v. 
Nixon, 249 F.3d 814, 819 (8th Cir. 2001) (construing the Missouri statute 
prohibiting price discrimination in the buying of livestock to sales of livestock in 
Missouri only); S.K.I. Beer Corp. v. Baltika Brewery, 443 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319–
20 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (refusing to apply the New York law regarding brewer–
wholesaler relationships to a contract for the sale of beer that took place outside 
the state and noting that a contrary interpretation would present extraterritoriality 
problems); Union Underwear Co., Inc. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Ky. 
2001) (holding that Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act did not apply to an employer 
whose headquarters were in Kentucky, when the acts giving rise to the lawsuit 
occurred in another state) (“Imposing the policy choice by the Commonwealth on 
the employment practices of our sister states should be done with great prudence 
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IV. WHAT KILLED EXTRATERRITORIALITY? 
In the space of a decade and a half, extraterritoriality went from 
being a potentially robust limit on the power of states to extend their 
regulatory reach into other states to a narrow limit on the power to 
regulate prices in other jurisdictions. While it is not unusual for the 
Court to announce a potentially sweeping decision or doctrine only 
to retreat from its implications,87 it is a rare enough event that it 
furnishes an occasion for reflection. So, the question arises: What 
killed extraterritoriality or, at least, limited it significantly? 
In this Part, I will argue that at least four factors contributed to 
the doctrine’s demise. First, extraterritoriality as constitutional 
doctrine suffered from what Kermit Roosevelt has termed 
calcification. Second, the doctrine—especially as recharacterized in 
Healy—lacked a limiting principle, a fact demonstrated by early 
litigation over state regulation of the Internet. Concerns over 
extraterritoriality’s sweep also surfaced during the short-lived 
litigation initiated by state and local governments over gun 
manufacturers’ distribution practices. Third, when the Court 
clarified that the constitutional locus for its limits on state punitive 
damage awards was the Due Process Clause, it deprived DCCD 
extraterritoriality of a potential new role. Finally, the Court has 
tended to limit, rather than expand, the DCCD generally in the years 
since Healy, making the prospects for a revival of extraterritoriality 
in a broad form rather dim. Because any one of these would likely 
have been sufficient to limit the doctrine, the Court’s abandonment 
of DCCD extraterritoriality could be said to have been 
overdetermined. 
A. “Constitutional Calcification” 
Kermit Roosevelt has argued that what he terms “constitutional 
calcification” can infect constitutional decision rules and warp 
constitutional doctrine in harmful ways.88 In this Section, I argue 
that DCCD extraterritoriality suffered from both “loss of fit” and 
“calcification,” to employ Roosevelt’s terms. Both undoubtedly led 
the Court to limit the doctrine, perhaps as a prelude to ultimately 
abandoning it. 
                                                                                                             
 
and caution out of respect for the sovereignty of other states, and to avoid running 
afoul of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.”). 
 87. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), with Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 88. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1652. 
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1. Loss of Fit 
Roosevelt wrote that sometimes “decision rules that made sense 
when adopted may lose their fit,” in which case “the Court will find 
it necessary to change the decision rules.”89 For example, the Court 
used to employ a rational basis test in scrutinizing gender-based 
classifications.90 By the 1970s, attitudes towards the legitimacy of 
gender-based classifications had changed, and the Court found it 
necessary first to apply a more rigorous type of rational basis 
scrutiny, then to replace it altogether with the more searching 
intermediate scrutiny.91 
Extraterritoriality suffered from a similar loss of fit. Recall that 
the doctrine grew out of the Court’s attempt to sort permissible from 
impermissible state regulations of interstate commerce by upholding 
“indirect” regulations of interstate commerce and invalidating 
“direct” regulations of it. Extraterritorial regulations of interstate 
commerce were regarded as paradigmatically direct regulations, 
exceeding the legislative jurisdiction of states. 
But the Court no longer—and has not for some time—enforces 
the DCCD using those decision rules. The key concept is now 
whether a state or local law is discriminatory, not whether it directly 
regulates commerce. Concerns that states have exceeded their 
proper legislative jurisdiction are constitutional matters but ones 
that, as Donald Regan suggested in his essay on the subject, are “not 
. . . dormant commerce clause problem[s].”92 There are clues in 
MITE and Healy that the Court itself recognized this, for in each the 
Court furnished an alternative ground for its holding that employed 
the Court’s contemporary DCCD decision rules. 
The portion of MITE discussing extraterritoriality garnered only 
a plurality, in contrast to the portion of Justice White’s opinion that 
concluded the Illinois Act failed Pike balancing.93 The Act deprived 
shareholders of the opportunity to proffer their shares at a premium 
and the Court concluded that these costs were “clearly excessive” 
when compared with Illinois’ asserted interests in regulating 
resident shareholders and regulating the internal affairs of Illinois 
corporations.94 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. at 1686–87. 
 90. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465 (1948); Roosevelt, supra 
note 6, at 1687. 
 91. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1688. 
 92. Regan, supra note 1, at 1873. 
 93. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“The 
Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. . . .”). 
 94. Id. at 640, 644–46 (citations omitted). 
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In Healy, as well, Justice Blackmun’s opinion held that the 
Connecticut price affirmation statute discriminated against interstate 
commerce on its face, in addition to having an impermissible 
extraterritorial effect.95 “By its plain terms,” he wrote:  
[T]he Connecticut affirmation statute applies solely to 
interstate brewers or shippers of beer, that is, either 
Connecticut brewers who sell both in Connecticut and in at 
least one border State or out-of-state shippers who sell both 
in Connecticut and in at least one border State. Under the 
statute, a manufacturer or shipper of beer is free to charge 
wholesalers within Connecticut whatever price it might 
choose so long as that manufacturer or shipper does not sell 
its beer in a border State. This discriminatory treatment 
establishes a substantial disincentive for companies doing 
business in Connecticut to engage in interstate commerce, 
essentially penalizing Connecticut brewers if they seek 
border-state markets and out-of-state shippers if they choose 
to sell both in Connecticut and in a border State.96 
Alternative grounds for the same constitutional claim would be 
unnecessary had extraterritoriality been seamlessly integrated into 
the Court’s existing two-tier DCCD standard of review.97 
2. Calcification 
Roosevelt termed the more serious doctrinal defect, 
“calcification.”98 This occurs when “decision rules [are] mistaken for 
                                                                                                             
 95. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 96. Id. at 341. 
 97. As noted above, see supra notes 25–41 and accompanying text, there was 
a loss of fit not only within the DCCD—between extraterritoriality and the 
contemporary doctrine’s focus on discrimination and protectionism—but also a 
loss of fit across other doctrines as well. Healy imposed greater limits on 
extraterritorial state power under the DCCD at the same time that the Court was 
relaxing restrictions on state power to regulate cross-border conduct in related 
doctrines. Under the Due Process Clause, for example, the Court had concluded 
that “minimum contacts” sufficed for states to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
nonresidents.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  Similarly, 
the Court concluded that a state need only demonstrate sufficient contacts that 
create “state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair” in conflicts of law cases.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 
U.S. 302, 313 (1981).  Likewise, the Court had, by the mid-1970s, concluded that 
interstate commerce could be taxed as long as the taxing state had a sufficient 
“nexus” with the taxpayer, the taxes did not discriminate, the taxes were 
apportioned, and the taxes were related to the services provided by the state. 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1977). 
 98. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1693. 
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constitutional operative propositions.”99 Consequences of 
calcification include “ill-advised doctrinal reform, attempts to bind 
nonjudicial actors to decision rules rather than operative propositions, 
and an undoing of the benefits of decision rules.”100 Justice 
Blackmun’s broad reformulation of DCCD extraterritoriality in Healy 
suggests the principle was well on its way to calcification had the 
Court not circumscribed the doctrine in Walsh. 
It is important to remember that DCCD extraterritoriality was 
itself a doctrinal subset of the direct–indirect decision rule that itself 
was an attempt to implement another set of decision rules—namely, 
Cooley’s distinction between national and local subjects. But the 
Commerce Clause does not restrict states to the regulation of local 
subjects or limit their power to indirect regulation of interstate 
commerce. Nor does it expressly mandate territorial exercises of 
state regulatory power. These were merely decision rules intended to 
implement an inchoate sense that the Clause placed some judicially 
enforceable limits on state power to regulate interstate commerce. 
If, as I have argued elsewhere,101 the constitutional operative 
proposition the DCCD is meant to implement is that states cannot 
regulate interstate commerce in ways that endanger the national 
political union the Constitution established, then it is not clear that 
extraterritoriality decision rules are especially helpful or useful in 
implementing that constitutional principle. Or at least the friction 
generated by extraterritorial regulations of commerce does not seem 
as potentially disruptive as the retaliatory cycles that discrimination 
produces. Further, as the Court seems to have concluded in its 
punitive damages jurisprudence,102 the Due Process Clause is the 
more appropriate constitutional source for general limits on 
extraterritorial regulation.103 
B. Lack of a Limiting Principle: Two Case Studies 
A second problem with DCCD extraterritoriality, at least with 
Healy’s sweeping restatement of the doctrine, was its lack of a 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Denning, supra note 15, at 484–85. 
 102. See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Felmly, supra note 1, at 508 (“[T]he similarities between the ability of 
a state to assert jurisdiction over and pass legislation concerning individuals 
beyond its borders have thus raised the question of whether the extraterritoriality 
principle should be located within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” (citation omitted)). Professor Regan famously concluded that while 
extraterritoriality lacked a clear textual basis it was a structural principle inherent 
in the federal system established by the Constitution. Regan, supra note 1, at 1887. 
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limiting principle. Had the Court pressed Healy to its limits, DCCD 
extraterritoriality could have become a significant restriction on state 
regulatory power. 
Justice Scalia’s Healy concurrence raised this concern.104 
Labeling the extraterritoriality principle “both dubious and 
unnecessary to decide the present cases,”105 Justice Scalia concurred 
on the ground that the price affirmation act was discriminatory. “I 
would refrain,” he wrote, “from applying the more expansive 
analysis which finds the law unconstitutional because it regulates or 
controls beer pricing in the surrounding States. . . . The difficulty 
with this is that innumerable valid state laws affect pricing decisions 
in other States—even so rudimentary a law as a maximum price 
regulation.”106 He added: “I do not think our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence should degenerate into disputes over degree of 
economic effect.”107 
Between Healy and Walsh, the rise of the Internet (and state 
attempts to regulate it) and municipal lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers pointed up the consequences of enforcing Healy’s 
sweeping version of extraterritoriality, causing scholars to question 
its origins and application. 
1. Internet Regulation 
Academics like Glenn Reynolds raised early questions about the 
ability of states, consistent with the DCCD, to regulate online 
activity.108 On cue, a New York federal district court stymied an 
attempt by the state to punish dissemination of pornography and 
other material deemed harmful to minors over the Internet.109 Citing 
cases from Baldwin to BMW, the Court concluded that the act had 
impermissible extraterritorial sweep and enjoined its enforcement. 
“The nature of the Internet,” the court wrote,  
makes it impossible to restrict the effects of the New York 
Act to conduct occurring within New York. An Internet user 
may not intend that a message be accessible to New Yorkers, 
but lacks the ability to prevent New Yorkers from visiting a 
                                                                                                             
 104. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989)  (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 105. Id. at 345. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and “Virtual Welters”: A Note on 
the Commerce Clause Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REV. 535 
(1996). 
 109. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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particular Website . . . . Thus, conduct that may be legal in 
the state in which the user acts can subject the user to 
prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the user’s 
home state’s policy—perhaps favoring freedom of 
expression over a more protective stance—to New York’s 
local concerns. New York has deliberately imposed its 
legislation on the Internet and, by doing so, projected its law 
into other states whose citizens use the Net. This 
encroachment upon the authority which the Constitution 
specifically confers upon the federal government and upon 
the sovereignty of New York’s sister states is per se violative 
of the Commerce Clause.110 
Subsequent articles argued that the DCCD extraterritoriality posed 
real problems for state regulation of the Internet.111 The American 
Library Association case emboldened plaintiffs to challenge other 
regulations, like those regulating the sending unsolicited email 
messages (spam).112 
But in an influential Yale Law Journal article published in 2001, 
Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes threw cold water on the efforts to 
apply broad DCCD extraterritoriality to state Internet regulation. 
Their article was a powerful critique of the principle, as well. 
Healy’s extraterritoriality principle, they argued, was “clearly 
too broad. Scores of state laws validly apply to and regulate 
commercial conduct that produces harmful local effects.”113 The 
American Library Association court’s logic “would condemn an 
extraordinary array of state laws as applied to cross-border activity 
that no one heretofore viewed as problematic.”114 They pointed out 
that “a state regulation of cross-border harms” with impacts “on out-
of-state actors cannot by itself be the touchstone for illegality” under 
DCCD extraterritoriality.115 “State regulations are routinely upheld 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. at 177. 
 111. See, e.g., Dan Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 
1127–32 (1996); Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits 
on State Regulation of the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 
889 (1998) (concluding that the likelihood of inconsistent and conflicting state 
regulations counseled in favor of exclusive federal Internet regulation). But see 
James E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting 
the Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095 (1999) (arguing 
against the application of extraterritoriality to state Internet regulation). 
 112. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 1, at 793–94 (describing early 
challenges to state antispam laws). 
 113. Id. at 790. 
 114. Id. at 823. 
 115. Id. at 803. 
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despite what is obviously a significant impact on outside actors.”116 
By way of illustration, they noted that “[m]ultistate firms often face 
[costs keeping up with multiple regulatory regimes] with respect to 
varying state tax laws, libel laws, securities requirements, charitable 
registration requirements, franchise laws, tort laws, and much 
more.”117 
Moreover, they argued that extraterritoriality was a poor fit with 
the DCCD’s main focus: restricting protectionism among states. 
“The protectionist concern,” they noted, “is not generally implicated 
by the Internet pornography and spam cases,” which applied 
evenhandedly.118 “Instead, the Internet cases implicate a . . . 
problem presented by state regulation of cross-border 
externalities.”119 Better, they concluded, that the burdens associated 
with crossborder regulation of externalities be examined by 
balancing the burdens with the local benefits—ordinary Pike 
balancing, in other words.120 
2. Municipal Gun Litigation 
About the same time courts were applying DCCD 
extraterritoriality to state Internet regulations, state and municipal 
governments were suing gun manufacturers for engaging in 
allegedly tortious marketing and distribution practices.121 The 
manufacturers objected, claiming that the remedies sought, 
including injunctive relief mandating changes in nationwide 
marketing and distribution of their products, would have 
impermissible extraterritorial effects.122 Success was decidedly 
mixed. One court dismissed a suit on extraterritoriality grounds, but 
the dismissal did not survive appeal.123 Some courts, though, 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 804. 
 118. Id. at 798. See also Felmly, supra note 1, at 507 (observing that “the 
extraterritoriality principle is not concerned with discrimination, protectionism, or 
with the process of state legislation”); supra text accompanying notes 89–97. 
 119. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 1, at 798. 
 120. Id. at 806. 
 121. See generally Timothy D. Lytton, Introduction: An Overview of Suits 
Against the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL & MASS TORT 1 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 
paperback ed. 2006). 
 122. I, too, argued that the suits were vulnerable to an extraterritoriality 
challenge. Brannon P. Denning, Gun Litigation and the Constitution, in SUING THE 
GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 121, at 315, 339. 
 123. See City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 45D05-005-
CT-243, 2001 WL 333111, at *6 (Ind. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2001) (“Defendants 
suggest that the City’s lawsuit, in violation of the Commerce Clause, seeks to 
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seemed to skirt the issue, either holding that the suits did not 
constitute “regulation” implicating the DCCD at all,124 or that the 
DCCD’s protections were not triggered by common law tort suits.125 
The efforts to avoid application of the DCCD suggested the judges 
were worried the doctrine might have some kind of bite.  
The passage of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
preempted many of the state and municipal claims against gun 
manufacturers,126 but scholars like Allen Rostron nevertheless 
worried about the implications of a robust DCCD extraterritoriality 
for a variety of state regulatory regimes.127 DCCD extraterritoriality, 
he argued, was out of step with the retreat from a strict territoriality 
                                                                                                             
 
regulate the lawful conduct of the defendants outside Gary’s borders, in their 
production, distribution and sales practices. As such, the City’s proposed claim 
and relief inevitably have an unconstitutional and extraterritorial effect.”), rev’d, 
801 N.E.2d 1222, 1236–37 (Ind. 2003). But see City of Cincinnati v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (rejecting the argument that a 
municipal tort suit against a gun manufacturer seeking injunctive relief to force 
changes in marketing and distribution of firearms did not constitute impermissible 
extraterritorial regulation). See also New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. 
Supp. 2d 256, 285–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 124. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2003); 
District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 656–58 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 2005) (upholding the D.C. ordinance imposing strict liability in tort for 
manufacturers of “machine guns” or “assault weapons” for injuries arising out of 
discharge of weapons within the District in holding that no extraterritorial 
regulation exists where the only “regulation” is the possible imposition of tort 
damages). 
 125. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 
254–55 (D.N.J. 2000) (dismissing county complaint against gun manufacturers for 
negligent marketing and distribution of handguns and expressing skepticism that 
such suits might implicate the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine) (“The Court 
finds that plaintiff’s claims in this case would almost certainly have a negative 
effect upon interstate commerce, but also that there would undoubtedly be strong 
local benefits involved if the county succeeded in stemming the tide of gun 
violence within its borders.”). 
 126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006). See generally Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1140–41 
(upholding PLCAA against, inter alia, claims that Act exceeded Congress’s 
commerce power); Jenny Jiang, Regulating Litigation Under the Protection of 
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Economic Activity or Regulatory Nullity?, 70 
ALB. L. REV. 537 (2007); Alden Crow, Comment, Shooting Blanks: The 
Ineffectiveness of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 59 S.M.U. L. 
REV. 1813 (2006); R. Clay Larkin, Note, The “Protection of Lawful Commerce in 
Arms Act”: Immunity for the Firearms Industry Is a (Constitutional) Bullseye, 95 
KY. L.J. 187 (2006–2007). 
 127. Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided 
Revival of Strict Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 115, 151–56. 
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that had occurred in all other areas of American law.128 Cases like 
Healy revived that restrictive model without offering clear 
guidelines for its application.129 
Rostron cautioned that the extraterritoriality arguments proffered 
by gun manufacturers were “extreme” and that, “if accepted and 
applied beyond the context of the gun litigation, would truly return 
the limits on state authority to where they stood a century ago.”130  
He continued: 
In the end, there are no limitations that narrow the gun 
companies’ argument and preclude it from applying equally to 
all of the many cases in which courts adjudicate state-law 
claims based on a defendant’s commercial conduct that occurs 
wholly outside the state. Taken to its logical conclusion, their 
argument applies even to a simple common-law tort claim for 
damages brought by a private individual against an out-of-
state manufacturer of a product that caused an injury.131 
Such extreme results, as he saw them, led Rostron to invite “the 
Supreme Court [to] expressly disavow the statements in [MITE] and 
Healy, which interpreted the Constitution as forbidding the 
application of a state’s commerce statutes to conduct that takes place 
wholly outside of the state’s borders but has effects within the 
state.”132 As I have argued, this is precisely what the Court did in 
Walsh.133 
C. The Due Process Clause and Punitive Damages 
Despite the tantalizing hints in BMW v. Gore that the DCCD 
extraterritoriality operated to limit a state’s ability to impose 
punitive damages on defendants for out-of-state conduct,134 the 
Court’s next punitive damages case dropped all references to Healy 
and the Commerce Clause, locating the limits in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In State Farm Mutual 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 127 (“The strict territorial approach to the reach of state law 
appeared to be dead as the last decades of the twentieth century began.”). 
 129. Id. at 134 (observing that the Court’s decisions “provided no clear 
statement of . . . a distinction [between economic regulation and other forms of 
state law] or any explanation about how exactly to determine what sorts of state 
law should be subject to the strict territorial rule” (citation omitted)); id. at 140 
(“The Supreme Court’s decisions have charted no clear path for other courts to 
follow.”). 
 130. Id. at 151. 
 131. Id. at 156. 
 132. Id. at 172 (citation omitted). 
 133. See supra notes 74–86 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text. 
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Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell135—decided the same 
term as Walsh—Justice Kennedy declared that “[t]he Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of 
grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”136 While 
the Court noted that “[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct 
that may have been lawful where it occurred” and that “as a general 
rule . . . a State [has no] legitimate concern in imposing punitive 
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside 
of the State’s jurisdiction,”137 the cases cited relied on the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, not the 
Commerce Clause. 
Four years later, in Phillip Morris, U.S.A. v. Williams,138 the 
Court held that “the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a 
State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for 
injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or . . . injury that it inflicts 
upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.”139 In a 
listing of cases supporting the proposition, BMW is clearly included 
with others that root this principle in the Due Process Clause. 
The Court’s pivot to the Due Process Clause in punitive damage 
cases, along with its and other courts’ disinclination to embrace 
broad sweep for DCCD extraterritoriality, left it stranded—a 
doctrinal oxbow lake. The Court’s changing attitude about the 
DCCD, moreover, leaves prospects for an extraterritoriality revival 
rather bleak.  
D. The Court’s Second Thoughts About the DCCD  
The abandonment of DCCD extraterritoriality is of a piece with 
a more general retreat from the DCCD by the Supreme Court. In 
2003, when Walsh was decided, Justice Thomas announced his 
intention never again to vote to invalidate a state law challenged 
under the DCCD.140 Even Justice Scalia, a trenchant critic of the 
                                                                                                             
 135. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 136. Id. at 416 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. at 421. The Court also appealed to the “basic principle of federalism . . 
. that each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is 
permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone can determine 
what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 422 (citation omitted). 
 138. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 139. Id. at 353. 
 140. Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 68 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (objecting to majority conclusion that milk pricing statute was subject 
to DCCD review). See also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Ass’n v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 
644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (approving majority’s decision to reject 
DCCD claim against Maine drug price control plan and quoting Hillside Diary 
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DCCD, does not quite go that far. He at least is willing on stare 
decisis grounds to invalidate discriminatory laws or cases that are 
indistinguishable from others the Court has decided. But Justice 
Scalia has long argued that the Court ought never to engage in the 
balancing of costs and benefits of nondiscriminatory laws.141 
Justice Scalia’s campaign against the DCCD may be winning 
some converts on the Court besides Justice Thomas. In 2007, for 
example, the Court created a then-unknown exception to the 
DCCD’s antidiscrimination principle for discrimination in favor of 
public entities.142 The next term it applied that newly minted 
exception to a state law offering preferential tax treatment to income 
derived from bonds issued by the taxing state or its subdivisions.143 
In the course of the latter case, Justice Souter, who authored the 
opinion, called into question the continued viability of Pike 
balancing, where nondiscriminatory laws burdening commerce have 
those burdens weighed against the putative local benefits of those 
laws.144 Since 2000, in fact, the Court has invalidated only one state 
law under the DCCD: a law permitting the direct sale of locally 
produced wine to consumers.145 Under the Roberts Court, only 
Justices Kennedy and Alito seem willing to enforce the DCCD 
wholeheartedly.146 
This judicial hostility—or indifference—to the DCCD’s 
established prongs, antidiscrimination and Pike balancing, strongly 
suggest little appetite for reviving a branch of the DCCD that in 
broad form had sweeping effects. While the Roberts Court is not 
inclined to overruling prior cases outright,147 it is fair to conclude in 
                                                                                                             
 
dissent). See also generally Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause: Anatomy of a Doctrinal Divorce (July 22, 2012) (unpublished 
work) (on file with author). 
 141. See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 
897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that balancing interests is not possible 
because the interests balanced are incommensurate: “It is more like judging 
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”). 
 142. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
 143. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 361–62 (2008). For a 
critique of the exception, see Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The 
“New Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 247 (2009). 
 144. Davis, 553 U.S. at 338–39. 
 145. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). 
 146. See, e.g., Davis, 553 U.S. at 362 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United 
Haulers, 550 U.S. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 147. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular 
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010). 
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light of Walsh and subsequent events, that DCCD extraterritoriality 
is, for all intents and purposes, dead. 
V. ON “INCONSISTENT STATE REGULATIONS” 
Recall that one justification for continuing to enforce DCCD 
extraterritoriality was that if state law was not cabined, interstate 
actors would be subject to a skein of inconsistent, possibly 
conflicting, regulatory regimes.148 A related fear was that one state 
might establish a rule that was more strict than any other state’s rule 
and that an interstate actor might comply with the strict rule, thus 
permitting a single state to establish a de facto national standard.149 
Undoubtedly, the Court has, in the past, held unconstitutional state 
laws that imposed what the Court saw as conflicting and 
inconsistent regulations.150  
The question arises, then: What does the death of DCCD 
extraterritoriality mean for these related “inconsistent state regulations” 
cases? The answer has to be, I think, that nondiscriminatory, but 
burdensome and perhaps conflicting, laws should be evaluated under 
Pike balancing, with the evidence of conflicting regulatory regimes 
used to prove that a law or laws are burdensome. Professor Regan put it 
well when he wrote that “[t]he commercial enterprise that chooses to 
operate in more than one state must simply be prepared to conform its 
various local operations to more than one set of laws. The Constitution 
                                                                                                             
 148. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 149. So. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 773, 795 (1945) (invalidating state 
train length law and noting that the alternative to breaking up trains at state borders 
“is for the carrier to conform to the lowest train limit restriction of any of the states 
through which its trains pass, whose laws thus control the carriers’ operations both 
within and without the regulating state”). 
 150. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Trucking Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 
(1959) (invalidating a law requiring the use of contoured mudguards on trucks 
when many other states required use of straight mudguards); Morgan v. Virginia, 
328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946) (holding the state law requiring segregation of interstate 
bus passengers unconstitutional). In Morgan v. Virginia, the Court wrote: 
As no state law can reach beyond its own border nor bar transportation of 
passengers across its boundaries, diverse seating requirements for the 
races in interstate journeys result. As there is no federal act dealing with 
the separation of races in interstate transportation, we must decide the 
validity of this Virginia statute on the challenge that it interferes with 
commerce, as a matter of balance between the exercise of the local police 
power and the need for national uniformity in the regulations for 
interstate travel. 
Morgan, 328 U.S. at 386.  
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does not give an enterprise any special privileges just because it 
happens to operate across state lines.”151 
Professors Goldsmith and Sykes agreed: “States are allowed to 
make their own regulatory judgments about scores of issues. The 
mere fact that states may promulgate different substantive 
regulations of the same activity cannot possibly be the touchstone 
for illegality under the dormant Commerce Clause.”152 They too 
urged analysis of those cases under Pike balancing to guard against 
the possibility that the “compliance costs” imposed by “nonuniform 
state regulations” are “so severe that they counsel against permitting 
the states to regulate a particular subject matter”153 or because the 
“regulatory benefits . . . were illusory while the costs of complying 
with the local regulation were severe.”154 
CONCLUSION 
Charles Fried has observed that the Court’s constitutional 
doctrine often follows a common law model, whereby 
particularistic decisions, moved by the force of urgent 
specifics, may for a time exert their influence in a case-by-
case accretion of precedents in similar circumstances, but 
their influence cannot forever be exerted in this sideways 
fashion. Eventually they either run out, or, if potent, they 
invite courts to move to higher levels of abstraction, where 
more general propositions are announced, and it is these that 
begin to take over some of the work of deciding cases.155 
DCCD extraterritoriality, it seems, was a doctrine potent enough 
to move to that higher level of abstraction. It then stalled once the 
Justices realized (1) that the doctrine was a poor fit with the larger 
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DCCD, which focused on discrimination and protectionism rather 
than whether a state law “directly” regulated interstate commerce; 
and (2) the implications of taking the new rule seriously, as 
illustrated by lower courts using it to thwart state regulation of the 
Internet and litigants claiming that common tort remedies were 
subject to its strictures. The Court’s decision to ground its punitive 
damages decisions on due process principles and the general retreat 
from the DCCD also contributed to extraterritoriality’s demise and 
make prospects for its future revival unlikely. 
As one who firmly believes in the utility of studying doctrinal 
development and application in general,156 extraterritoriality’s demise 
holds some larger lessons about the life cycle of decision rules. First, 
decision rules are tools that aid the Court in rendering judgments. 
Simply saying that the Constitution requires states to provide all 
persons “equal protection of the laws” does not get one very far down 
the road when deciding whether a state can prevent opticians from 
making glasses without a prescription from an optometrist or 
ophthalmologist157 or whether a state may extend preferences in 
higher education admissions to certain underrepresented racial 
groups.158 But decision rules have to be altered when the Court’s 
understanding of the constitutional principles they implement change, 
lest doctrine succumb to Roosevelt’s “calcification.” Once the Court 
had shifted from its focus on direct versus indirect regulations to 
discrimination, extraterritoriality no longer made any sense as a 
dormant Commerce Clause decision rule.159 Yet it persisted, leading 
to no small confusion in the courts as to DCCD extraterritoriality’s 
scope. 
On the other hand, the problem is largely self-correcting. The 
Court can alter, amend, or even abandon decision rules when they 
outlive their usefulness or become attenuated from the constitutional 
principle they were created to serve. Perhaps, then, the more 
important contribution of essays like this one is to encourage judges 
and the Justices to approach the decision rules they create with more 
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intentionality in hopes of facilitating the creation of useful rules and 
the communication of those rules to policy makers and lower court 
judges.  More importantly, the Court should not hesitate to prune the 
rules that have lost vitality and whose existence confuses and 
complicates doctrine to the detriment of constitutional law more 
generally. 
  
